This blog entry also appears on Our Kingdom, where comments, questions and other reactions can be posted by registered users.
You may not have noticed, but a battle important to parliamentary democracy commenced yesterday. At Prime Minister's Questions Gordon Brown stated that he welcomed the report published on Tuesday by the Select Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons, chaired by Tony Wright MP, adding 'I believe that there will be a warm welcome for some of the proposals in the report [emphasis added].'
Brown's underwhelming response to this publication, Rebuilding the House, should be taken as a compliment by those responsible for producing it; and an indication that its contents are worth fighting for. Wright's Committee was established in the wake of the expenses scandal earlier this year and could represent the most substantial 'official' attempt to seize the 'moment' for democratic reform that appeared at this point. It looked at three main issues: the appointment of select committees, the control of the business of the House; and public engagement with it.
The terms of reference have been viewed as too narrow by some, including Michael Meacher MP but there is no doubt that they cover important subjects. The Committee has made significant proposals in the first area, that would give the House, as opposed to the whips who currently dominate, an enhanced role in determining the chairs and other members of Commons select committees. This advance would be much needed from a democratic perspective, since it is clearly inappropriate that individuals with key responsibility for holding the government to account should be selected by the executive.
On public engagement, the third item on its list, the Committee is less impressive and has been criticised by the Hansard Society for a lack of radicalism. But it seems that a strategic decision was taken to focus on the second subject: control of the timetable of the Commons. The logic here is clear. Until this issue is properly addressed public engagement will lack meaning, and the public could be forgiven for thinking that Parliament is not really an entity worth engaging with. In the words of the Committe, broadly speaking 'the Government enjoys not merely precedence but exclusive domination of much of the House's agenda, and can stop others seeking similar control.'
As with arrangements for select committees, it is democratically indefensible that a body responsible for holding the executive to account and for representing the country as a whole should be dominated by government in this way. The report concludes that 'The agenda should fall to be decided by the House', if necessary by a vote; and proposes structural changes to reduce the level of government preeminence, including the establishment of a Backbench Business Committee elected by a secret ballot of the whole House.
Such a change would be important in perceptual terms, underlining that Parliament is an entity in its own right, and hopefully encouraing cultural change in this direction in the process. It could also facilitate further positive developments.To take one, in the past I have been critical of government proposals presented as providing Parliament with a greater part in treaty-making, on the grounds that they would create only a theoretical right and would rarely lead to debates about particular international agreements, let alone votes on whether they should be ratified.
Yet the shift in responsibility advocated by the Committee might make such consideration a genuine prospect. We should remain aware of what the Committee describes as 'real-world political constraints'. There is only so much Parliament can do within its calendar; and much of the time MPs will wish to behave in a partisan fashion, rather than as Parliamentarians per se.
But Brown's guarded reaction yesterday confirms that the Committee has made proposals which would significantly alter the way in which Parliament operates. They deserve support, and the Commons should be given the opportunity for a free vote on them, as proposed by the Committee, not in any other diluted form.
Andrew Blick
Senior Research Fellow
Democratic Audit
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Posted: Thursday 1 July
Localism: the new politics of old
This blog entry also appears on Our Kingdom, where comments, questions and other reactions can be posted by registered users.
The Local Government Association (LGA) has published a remarkable pamphlet to coincide with its annual conference, taking place in Harrogate this week. The glossy, professionally-designed eleven page document is what we've come to expect from local government these days. It is the text which is surprising. The pamphlet is written with a passion, immediacy and radicalism unheard of in local government circles since the days of Red Ken's GLC, David Blunkett's Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire and Derek ‘Deggsy' Hatton's Militant resistance in Liverpool. Even the title of the pamphlet - ‘Who's in Charge? A Manifesto for a New Politics' - is reminiscent of the language associated with the radical localism of the New Urban Left in the early 1980s. Much of the text could have been borrowed, with minor modifications, from David Blunkett and Keith Jackson's (1987) book: ‘Democracy in Crisis: The Town Halls Respond'.
As such, established local government commentators will recognise that there is nothing particularly new in the demands made in the LGA's manifesto. It advocates rolling back the unelected Quango state; radical decentralisation to bring decision-making down to the lowest possible level; making local NHS bodies accountable to the electorate; a genuine power of general competence for local government, and real fiscal autonomy, including returning to councils the power to set local business rates.
The surprise is that these demands are being made by the usually ultra-cautious LGA, and that the case for them is underpinned by a sense of (justifiable) anger in a text whose authorship is jointly credited to the Leaders of the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and Independent groups within the Association. Consider this as a joint statement from the three main parties in local government: ‘Expenses scandals have catalysed a more fundamental and longstanding sense that the system doesn't care about the interests of real people and is run by cosy insiders for their own benefit'. Or this: ‘Until people have a real sanction over the things that matter most to them, they will, quite rightly, feel that voting doesn't matter, except as a way of venting their frustration with a political system that they feel works for the politicians, not for them.
In these times, such critique is possibly too easy. The far more intriguing part of the document, which provides its greatest claim to radicalism, is that all the main parties have signed up for an agenda of ‘more politics, less state'. On page three, the authors suggest the following:
Voters unsurprisingly feel excluded, disempowered, and angry. And while they vent their anger on politicians, the basic truth is that they want to see more politics, not less - just not the stale politics of national parties. On the contrary, it is the remote and unresponsive executive state that must shrink. In terms of the power and influence they wield, government must become smaller and citizens bigger.
This notion that the state must shrink and government must become smaller might seem at first sight to imply that the Conservative majority within the LGA was dominant in shaping this manifesto. This sort of language could equally be interpreted as being seriously at odds with Labour's preference for the interventionist state. But to see things this way would be to miss the point. There has always been a suppressed strand of radical Labour thought which favoured community and cooperative, rather than state, control. This is the neglected Guild Socialism of GDH Cole, rather than the dominant ‘commanding heights' state socialism of Sidney Webb, a vision of associational democracy in which fraternity and liberty matter just as much as equality. Notably, many Labour politicians seem to suppress their own preferences for such approaches, particularly once they become Cabinet Ministers, as the following extract from Blunkett and Jackson's (1987) book would seem to suggest:
We do not feel that the state should be the only means whereby people in need can find help and support (...) Collective community support, of the kind formerly seen in so many towns and villages, is vital, alongside the formal state provision. What we need is to do things together, rather than having them done for us.
Of course, like Blunkett and Jackson's writing, the LGA's pamphlet is a product of its times. Radical proposals for democratic reform have become de rigueur in the heady political atmosphere which has prevailed in elite circles since May 09. But, as I've argued elsewhere, it is far from certain that the reforming spirit is percolating through the Populus as a whole. Like others desperate not to miss this opportunity to push for reform, the LGA seeks to ‘front load' its case for change with questionable references to the apparent public desire for a new political settlement. The first paragraph of the text makes the following claim: ‘in the first week of June, the public spoke loudly and clearly through the ballot box. Voters want to see the political system change in response to their frustration with it'. Elsewhere the document asserts the superior democratic legitimacy of the LGA's vision for a new politics: ‘the LGA is made up of politicians who, unlike those at Westminster, have seen their mandates refreshed at the ballot box since 2005'.
This sort of analysis is seriously problematic. The local and European elections of June 2009 did produce dramatic results, but to argue that the public spoke loudly and clearly at the ballot box is plainly wrong. The vast majority of the electorate stayed at home, just as they normally do for local and European elections. We have no basis at all for assuming that continued large-scale electoral abstention indicates a widespread desire for radical change centred on a far-reaching programme of decentralisation. In this sense, the LGA are as guilty as other reformers who risk putting the cart before the horse. The actual case for constitutional reform and political decentralisation is the other way around; it is only through radical change that we will restore public confidence in our politics and be able to bring about a reversal of the mass boycotting of the ballot box which has become the most obvious hallmark of contemporary British democracy.
Stuart Wilks-Heeg
Executive Director
Democratic Audit |
| Posted: Thursday, 1 July, 1200 BST
Do the public really want to change ‘the system'?
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A poll commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust and reported in today's Guardian indicates that 75 per cent of those questioned believe either that the UK's system of government could be ‘improved a great deal' or that it could be improved ‘quite a lot'. A mere 3 per cent suggest that the system works well and could not be improved at all. The poll also suggests a clear majority - over 60 per cent - would be in favour of a more proportional electoral system.
The question asking survey respondents to assess the current system for governing Britain has been asked in an identical form in 15 surveys since 1973 and on a regular basis since 1991. The ‘net' score of -50 per cent in 2009 for faith in the system (calculated as the percentage largely in favour of leaving the system alone minus the percentage suggesting significant reforms are required) is the second lowest ever recorded (narrowly beaten only by the score of -53 per cent in 1995). The 42 per cent proportion responding that the system needs a great deal of improvement is the highest ever.
The results for 2009 are hardly surprising, other than for the fact that there are 3 per cent who somehow continue to believe that the system ‘works extremely well and could not be improved'. Likewise, nobody doubts that support for major constitutional and electoral reforms has received an enormous boost from the revelations surrounding MPs expenses. But everyone knows that these are exceptional times politically. To what extent do poll results like this reflect a deep-seated desire for system reforms?
Just as importantly, when people are polled on issues such as this, do they distinguish between the system of government and the party of government? These are clearly not the same thing. For instance, the way in which constitutional provisions do, or do not, define the role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, or the relationship of the Cabinet to the House of Commons, are entirely different concerns to how well the Prime Minister, Cabinet or Commons are performing. But do voters see things this way? Do they evaluate the system more positively when they are more satisfied with the job the government and the Prime Minister are doing? Are they more likely to advocate changes to the system of government when the economic climate is gloomy?
There is a way of seeking to answer these questions. Since 1979, MORI (now Ipsos MORI) has carried out monthly opinion polls asking people identical questions about their degree of satisfaction with how both the government is running the country and how the Prime Minister is doing her/his job. The same polls have also asked questions about the extent to which those surveyed are optimistic or pessimistic about future economic conditions. These polls are frequently used to derive rating for both net satisfaction with the government and Prime Minister (the percentage of satisfied respondents minus the percentage of dissatisfied respondents) and for net economic optimism (the percentage of respondents who believe economic condition will improve minus those who think things will get worse).
Figure 1 (click here to download) plots the figures for net ‘faith in the system' of government reported in surveys since 1991 alongside the net ‘scores' for satisfaction with how the government and the Prime Minister are doing their jobs, as well as the net level of economic optimism. There are many apparent quirks in these data sets. In the years for which data are plotted here, people were on balance always pessimistic about the economy, despite continuous economic growth during most of this period. Uniquely among the last four Prime Ministers, Tony Blair did not register a single negative score for net satisfaction during his entire period in office. But what we are looking for here are indicators of how these different facets of public opinion relate to each other. There are three obvious patterns which emerge.
First, while the public's assessment of the system of government is generally far more negative than the public's view of how well the government is doing its job, these two lines on the graph mirror each other almost perfectly - this can be seen more clearly in figure 2, in which the other two indicators of the public mood are removed. This would suggest that when there is a popular perception that the party of government is under-performing, more people are likely to suggest that the system of government needs to change. Yet, even if the system is unpopular and remains unchanged, the return of a new party of government seems to cause levels of satisfaction with the system to rise. This is likely to be part of the explanation for why parties promise reforms of the system in opposition, but generally fail to deliver such reforms once in government - in essence, a shift in the public mood allows them to get away with it.
Second, while the public's assessment during the Major years clearly distinguished between the role of the Prime Minister and the role of government, the tendency under Blair and Brown has been for the government and the Prime Minister to become virtually synonymous in the eyes of the electorate. This is perhaps yet another indicator of the extent to which the office of Prime Minister has dominated the executive and legislative branches of government since Labour were returned to office under Blair in 1997. Furthermore, while it is clear that the period since 2006 has witnessed a dramatic fall in satisfaction with Brown as a Prime Minister, particularly when compared to Blair, this has occurred alongside an equally sharp fall in satisfaction with the government and an equally obvious loss of faith in the system of government. While this reflects the more general tendency highlighted above, it also raises the question of what the causal factors may be. It is certainly possible that, post-Blair, dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister is a strong factor influencing popular criticism of the system of government.
Third, sharp downturns in economic optimism do seem to be associated with sharp downturns in the public's assessment of ‘the system', although it is likely that a line plotting the economic cycle, as measured by house prices or stock market values, would yield an even closer fit. It is notable that an upturn in economic optimism before the 1997 General Election appeared to result in higher satisfaction ratings for John Major and his government, but was clearly not enough to prevent the Conservatives sustaining heavy losses at the polls. For Gordon Brown and Labour to recover from here would be a political miracle. But the chances of the UK's system of government surviving intact are considerably higher.
Stuart Wilks-Heeg
Democratic Audit
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| Posted: Thursday, 18th June, 2000 BST
MPs expenses: democracy is dead, long live democracy!
What do the revelations about MPs' expenses tell us about the state of British democracy? The easy answer, which would understandably have most citizens nodding their heads in agreement, is that, at best, it underlines just how much our elected representatives have lost touch with those who elect them. At worst, it suggests that British democracy has finally rotted to the core.
It's undeniable that ‘Expensesgate' , as it has inevitably been dubbed, has eroded whatever was left of already rapidly diminishing public confidence in the integrity of politicians and political parties. But, if we step back and think about democracy far more broadly, as the Democratic Audit framework encourages us to do , then the events of the last few weeks have revealed some surprising things about the health of our democracy.
Let us not forget that serious concerns that MPs may be abusing the expenses system have been brewing for over a year and that the initial response of the majority of MPs was to try to prevent any further details coming into the public domain. From that starting point, the way events have unfolded since early 2008 provide at least five reasons to be cheerful about democracy in Britain.
First, we need to recognise the reasons why campaigners like Heather Brooke ever got past first base on this issue. Despite its limitations, especially those relating to parliamentary privilege, the testing of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, 2000 in the courts has shown it to have real teeth. The potential for FOI to prise open the culture of parliamentary and governmental secrecy and to provide for greater transparency and accountability in public affairs has been demonstrated.
Second, the Daily Telegraph's campaign on the issue underlines that investigative public interest journalism is alive and well. Questions have been asked about the legality of the newspaper's reporting, since the copies of receipts and correspondence it obtained were clearly not provided under FOI. But such questions barely seem to matter now. Instead, the whole episode serves to remind us that risky, investigative journalism is essential in a democracy if politicians and others in positions of power are to be held to account.
Third, while the culture of maximising expenses to top-up salaries had become accepted practice for some Parliamentarians, for every MP who is alleged to have milked the system, there are several more who resisted the temptation . They have attracted far less attention, but we must not forget the many MPs whose commitment to integrity, transparency and public service has been demonstrated quietly, but without question, over the past week or so.
Fourth, after a few initial attempts to defend the indefensible , the political parties demonstrated a capacity to recognise the seriousness of the problem, to take immediate steps wherever possible and to take decisive action in the cases of MPs whose expense claims raised the most serious concerns. In the face of widespread media and public outcry, there can be few, if any, MPs who would not agree that there is an urgent need to reform the expenses system. The matter had already been referred to the Committee on Standards in Public Life, whose Inquiry into this issue will clearly attract widespread public interest.
Finally, many voters will, quite understandably, feel that it is simply not enough to shut the stable door after the horse has bolted. Some will feel that the behaviour of their own MP is unforgivable, regardless of whether they have said ‘sorry' and regardless of how much money they have repaid. For all these voters, there will be an opportunity within the next 12 months or so to express that view via the ballot box. Citizens may also seek to stand for office themselves, or to initiate, join and support new political movements aiming to ‘clean up' politics.
That we have no such scope to hold banking executives to account in this way, even where banks are now majority-owned by the state, is a reminder of the power of democracy and, perhaps, also of where it falls too short.
This is not to suggest that the revelations about how the House of Commons has been conducting its affairs should not concern us deeply - of course they should. Neither is it to suggest that there are not serious deficiencies in how well democracy in the UK matches up to agreed international standards - of course there are. The key point is that whenever such revelations come to light, we need to be confident that our democratic arrangements are robust enough to ensure that our elected representatives respond. And, in this instance, perhaps unusually, it seems that they were.
Sure, it ain't been pretty, there are doubtless more revelations to come, and there is an enormous task ahead if any public confidence in politics is to be salvaged. But more than anything, Expensesgate reminds us exactly how democracy works and what democracy is for. Let's not squander the opportunity it offers to also ask what democratic measures might have prevented the whole sorry state of affairs in the first place.
Stuart Wilks-Heeg
Director, Democratic Audit
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Democracy: plus ça change?
The sense of déjà-vu in contemporary British politics seems uncanny. The main question, it would appear, is not whether political debate has been transported back to the past, but which decade it is that is currently repeating itself.
The recession has now been confirmed as the worst since the 1930s, although speculation that the government's policy response would be informed by revived interest in Keynes's (1936) General Theory has been downplayed after the April 2009 budget. Whether recent economic policy is rather more reminiscent of the 1970s is perhaps also debatable, but the rise of the far-right in British politics certainly does suggest echoes of that decade, particularly for those who confronted the rise of the National Front thirty years ago.
Meanwhile, serious questions about police accountability and new evidence relating to miscarriages of justice seem strongly reminiscent of debates about the criminal justice system in the 1980s. The recent cash-for questions scandal in the House of Lords drew obvious comparisons with the accusations of widespread accusations ‘sleaze' during the tail-end of the Major government in 1996-97 as, inevitably, has the recent furore over MPs expenses.
What should we make of all this? Is it the arrival of a post-modernist politics, in which contemporary political life becomes a pastiche of British politics from previous decades? Has the New Labour modernisation agenda simply gone into reverse? Is it is a paradox of hyper-politics, whereby the more swiftly events develop in the media age, the more they seems to resemble past events? Or is it perhaps just a reminder of a more familiar tendency: ‘Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose' - loosely translated by The Who's Pete Townsend as ‘Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss'.
That there can be remarkable continuity amid seemingly frenetic change is nowhere more obvious than in relation to democracy in the United Kingdom. Arguably, the fundamentals of our democracy change only very slowly - indeed, historical continuity is, to some, the very hallmark of the British constitution. Even in the face of civil wars and civil disobedience, democracy in the UK has evolved over a period of centuries rather than been ‘installed' following a particularly revolutionary moment.
In political terms, the pace of change has often breathtakingly slow. The Great Reform Act of 1832 resulted in a franchise of around 8% of the adult population and it took until 1928 for universal adult suffrage to become a reality. A full thirty-six years elapsed between Tony Benn successfully securing a change in the law to allow him to renounce his inherited peerage and the hereditary principle finally being abolished altogether, although Peers remain unelected. The first woman was elected to the House of Commons in 1918, but it was not until 1997 that more than 10% of the UK's MPs were female, and ten years on the 20% barrier is yet to be broken.
Just as Democratic Audit was being established in the early 1990s, Anthony Sampson reached the following sobering conclusions about the state of democracy in Britain:
The gap between government and governed looms wider than ever, and Britain is run by one of the most centralised and least accountable systems in the industrial world. (...) the British in the last decade have seen concentrations of power which the Victorians never dreamed of. The central control has tightened, and the countervailing powers outside Whitehall have been weakened. (...) Town halls and provincial cities have been by-passed. Individual schools and hospitals may gain financial autonomy, but they are becoming accountable less to their locality, and more to Whitehall. Parliament, while proclaiming its sovereignty, allows still more decisions to be taken by the party-machines, the executive, the cabinet and the Council and Commission in Brussels (A. Sampson, The Essential Anatomy of Britain: Democracy in Crisis, London, 1992, p.154).
Compare this to the conclusions reached by the Power Inquiry, which reported in 2006 that:
Unelected and indirectly elected authority has gained at the expense of directly elected authority (...) The Executive has become more powerful at the expense of MPs in the House of Commons (...) the influence of No.10 may well be greater than it has ever been (...) Central government departments have also become more powerful at the expense of local government (...) through tight control of finance and the enforcement of nationally set targets and guidelines (...) Wide areas of public service which were once under the remit of a local council are now governed by committees appointed by ministers or other committees (...) supranational bodies and processes of international negotiation such as the European Union have gained extra powers and influence at the expense of nationally and locally elected representatives (...) (Power to the People, 2006, pp.125-6).
To be fair, if we are to engage in a serious game of ‘spot the democratic difference' between 1992 and 2009, then we must not overlook that much has changed as a result of devolution, Lords reform, the Human Rights Act, the Freedom of Information Act. The question really, is what these changes amount to in shifting where power lies, how those who exercise power are held to account by the public, and how well the rights of British citizens are protected in practice.
The consensus on these matters at the recent Convention of Modern Liberty was clear - a parallel set of unspoken constitutional changes since 1997 has been more significant than formal constitutional reforms, serving to further strengthen the power of the executive and dramatically erode civil liberties. Over the same time period, formal participation in British political life, whether measured through voter turnout, party membership, or party activism has reached its unquestionable historical nadir. These are not moments of déjà-vu. They are long-run historical trends. Yet, with a crucial General Election looming, the need to recognise them as the causes of history seemingly repeating itself will never be more urgent.
Stuart Wilks-Heeg
Director, Democratic Audit
Posted: Tuesday, 12th May, 1300 BST |
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